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The Two-Foundings Thesis: The Puzzle of Constitutional 
Interpretation
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ABSTRACT
What explains the fact that justices, scholars, and practitioners have come to radically different 
views about the U.S. Constitution?  What explains the fact that some focus on the Constitution as a 
nationalistic document while others see it as a text to proscribe federal powers?  Why do originalists 
generally look to the past whereas moral readers look to the present in deciding the scope and existence 
of rights?  Why do originalists privilege a limited role for U.S. Congress whereas moral readers privilege 
a more expansive view?  These questions inform what we consider as the puzzle of constitutional 
interpretation, a puzzle that has gone largely unnoticed by legal scholars who have addressed the 
originalism/living constitutionalism debate, but not the foundational debate that generated it.  Legal 
scholars may analyze the nature of these debates from various perspectives, often seeking to explain 
why their particular account of interpretation is better or more justifiable.  An underlying assumption 
of these works is that these divergent theories about powers and rights cannot both be correct under 
the Constitution.  If anything, legal scholars sometimes seek to downplay this type of disagreement.
This Essay, in contrast, seeks to provide an explanation for these interpretive debates over powers and 
rights that is essentially connected to the Constitution.  It aims to explain how opposing viewpoints 
about power/rights and moral reading/originalism could both accurately reflect the theories on 
which the nation was founded.  In doing so, this Essay proposes that the Constitution itself is a 
bifurcated text created by the existence of America’s two foundings.  The first founding established 
state governments (between 1776 and 1781) and the second founding established the federal or 
national government (in 1787).  We argue that the Constitution simultaneously affirms both these 
foundings.  In doing so, the meaning of the Constitution has been perpetually trapped within these 
two foundational and divergent frameworks.
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Constitutional interpretation generates intense debates over rights and 
powers.  Countless U.S. Supreme Court decisions, articles, and books discuss 
these debates.  With regard to powers, these debates often center around a 
nationalistic view of the U.S. Constitution, where the U.S. Congress has broad 
and expansive powers, or a states’ rights view of the document, where 
Congress has narrow and limited powers.1  With regards to rights, these 
debates often center around an emphasis on a moral reading of various 
clauses2 versus an emphasis on originalism.3 
  
1. As Jesse Choper aptly stated: 
Constitutional issues of federalism, on the other hand, are a distinguishable 
species.  When the contention is made that the national government has engaged in 
activity beyond its delegated authority, or when it is alleged that an attempted state 
regulation intrudes into an area of exclusively national concern, the constitutional 
issue is wholly different from that posed by an assertion that certain government 
action abridges a personal liberty secured by the Constitution.  The essence of the 
individual rights claim is that no organ of government, national or state, may 
undertake the challenged activity.  In contrast, an alleged constitutional violation of 
the federalism principle concedes that one of the two levels of government has 
power to engage in the questioned conduct; the issue is simply whether the 
particular level that has acted is the constitutionally proper one. 
 Jesse H. Choper, The Scope of National Power Vis-a-Vis the States: The Dispensability of 
Judicial Review, 86 YALE L.J. 1552, 1555 (1977). 
2. See generally SOTIRIOS A. BARBER & JAMES E. FLEMING, CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION: THE BASIC QUESTIONS 155–70 (2007) (arguing that constitutional 
interpretation invariably entails a philosophical approach); RONALD DWORKIN, 
FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 2 (1996) (“The 
moral reading proposes that we all—judges, lawyers, citizens—interpret and apply 
[abstract clauses in the Constitution] on the understanding that they invoke moral 
principles about political decency and justice.”); DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING 
CONSTITUTION (2010) (defending a living constitutionalism that advocates for a 
common law approach to interpreting the U.S. Constitution). 
3. See generally ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 143–45 (1990) (“In truth, 
only the approach of original understanding meets the criteria that any theory of 
constitutional adjudication must meet in order to possess democratic legitimacy.”); 
JOHN O. MCGINNIS & MICHAEL B. RAPPAPORT, ORIGINALISM AND THE GOOD 
CONSTITUTION (2013) (arguing that the Constitution should be interpreted according to 
its meaning at that time); ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 16–18, 37–38 
(1997) (rejecting a common law approach to interpreting the Constitution); Keith E. 
Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 609 (2004) (“[T]he 
new originalism is focused less on the concrete intentions of individual drafters of 
constitutional text than on the public meaning of the text that was adopted.”). 
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These interpretive frameworks generate diametrically opposite 
conclusions.  A states’ right approach may invalidate a congressional law 
under the Commerce Clause while its nationalistic counterpart may uphold 
it.  A moral reading may entail that discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  An originalist approach may reject that.  Moreover, different 
interpretations of powers and rights also overlap in tellingly predictable ways.  
Those who are originalists generally treat Congress as having limited powers 
under the Constitution.  Those who are moral readers generally treat 
Congress as having expansive powers under the document. 
What explains the fact that justices, scholars, and practitioners have 
come to radically different views about the Constitution?  What explains the 
fact that some focus on the Constitution as a nationalistic document while 
others see it as a text to proscribe federal powers?  Why do originalists 
generally look to the past whereas moral readers look to the present in 
deciding the scope and existence of rights?  Why do originalists generally 
privilege a limited role for Congress whereas moral readers privilege a more 
expansive view?  These questions inform what we consider as the puzzle of 
constitutional interpretation, a puzzle that has gone largely unnoticed by legal 
scholars who have addressed the originalism/living constitutionalism debate, 
but not the foundational debate that generated it.  Legal scholars may analyze 
the nature of these debates from various perspectives, often seeking to explain 
why their particular account of interpretation is better or more justifiable.  An 
underlying assumption of these works is that these divergent theories about 
powers and rights cannot both be correct under the Constitution.4  If 
anything, legal scholars sometimes seek to downplay this type of 
disagreement, arguing, for instance, that everyone is really an originalist.5 
  
4.  Consider here Randy Barnett’s argument that the Constitution entails divergent views of 
popular sovereignty.  RANDY BARNETT, OUR REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION:  SECURING THE 
LIBERTY AND SOVEREIGNTY OF WE THE PEOPLE (2016).  On one hand, “[t]hose who favor 
the Democratic Constitution view We the People as a group, as a body, as a collective 
entity.”  Id. at 19.  On the other hand, “[t]hose who favor the Republican Constitution 
view We the People as individuals.”  Id.  Although his argument has some affinity with 
ours, he argues that we must reclaim the Republican Constitution as the historically 
correct view, with its emphasis on originalism rather than a living constitutionalism.  In 
contrast, as we outline in Part III, both theories of constitutional interpretation are 
historically justified. 
5. James Fleming makes this very point in responding to Lawrence Solum’s argument 
about the meaning of originalism. 
If we define originalism inclusively enough, we might say that we evidently are all 
originalists now.  Indeed, we might just define originalism so broadly that even I 
would no longer hope that we are not all originalists now! Applying Solum’s 
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This Essay, in contrast, seeks to provide an explanation for these 
interpretive debates over powers and rights that is essentially connected to the 
Constitution.  It aims to explain how opposing viewpoints about power/rights 
and moral reading/originalism could both accurately reflect the theories on 
which the nation was founded.  In doing so, this Essay proposes that the 
Constitution itself is a bifurcated text created by the existence of America’s 
two foundings.  The first founding established state governments (between 
1776 and 1781), and the second founding established the federal or national 
government (in 1787).6  We argue that the Constitution simultaneously 
affirms both these foundings.  In doing so, the meaning of the Constitution 
has been perpetually trapped within these two foundational and divergent 
frameworks. 
This Essay proceeds in three parts.  Part I outlines the nature of legal 
debates over powers and rights, demonstrating that justices often reach 
contrary conclusions in these cases.  This establishes the motivating puzzle of 
the Essay.  Part II discusses the way in which political scientists seek to explain the 
existence of such debates.  Political scientists, drawing on the attitudinal 
model, use political ideology to account for disagreement over interpretation.  
Because this account does not discuss the Constitution, it does not genuinely 
explain the puzzle posed by this Essay.  Part III seeks to explain this puzzle 
with the two-foundings thesis.  This thesis connects debates over powers and 
rights to the way in which the Constitution itself affirms two distinct but 
  
framework, we would conclude that Jack Balkin, with his self-described living 
originalist method of text and principle, definitely is an originalist.  Ronald 
Dworkin, with his moral reading of the Constitution, surely also is.  Sotirios A. 
Barber and I, with our philosophic approach to constitutional interpretation (and 
my own “Constitution-perfecting theory”), are as well. 
 James E. Fleming, Are We All Originalists Now?  I Hope Not!, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1785, 1787 
(2013) (footnotes omitted). 
  Solum’s framework appears in several notable texts.  See, e.g., JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING 
ORIGINALISM 3 (2011). (“Is our Constitution a living document that adapts to changing 
circumstances, or must we interpret it according to its original meaning?  For many 
years people have debated constitutional interpretation in these terms.  But the choice is 
a false one.  Properly understood, these two views of the Constitution are compatible 
rather than opposed.”); ROBERT W. BENNETT & LAWRENCE B. SOLUM, CONSTITUTIONAL 
ORIGINALISM: A DEBATE 4 (2011) (outlining originalism as a framework for 
constitutional interpretation and defining the public meaning thesis as: “Constitutional 
meaning is fixed by the understanding of the words and phrases and the grammar and 
syntax that characterized the linguistic practices of the public and not by the intentions 
of the framers.”). 
6. See ELVIN T. LIM, THE LOVERS’ QUARREL: THE TWO FOUNDINGS & AMERICAN POLITICAL 
DEVELOPMENT (2014) (explaining how the “Two Foundings” relate to scholarly debates 
in the field of American political development). 
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conflicting foundings.  This thesis both explains the contradictory positions 
over powers and rights and grounds this explanation in the Constitution 
itself. 
I. THE PUZZLE OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 
Scholars routinely disagree over how to interpret the Constitution.  
These debates generally fall into two categories: debates over powers and 
debates over rights.  The former category is about the nature and limits of 
state and congressional power, and the latter is about how to interpret the 
scope of rights.  Because this Essay is about explaining why these underlying 
disagreements exist (without advocating for any particular position), Part I is 
an admittedly brief and cursory exposition of these familiar debates. 
A. The Debate Over Powers 
The legal debate over power is about the scope of congressional power 
and, relatedly, the scope of state power.  There are two camps in this debate: 
the nationalists, who view Congress as having broad and expansive powers, 
and those committed to states’ rights, who view Congress as having narrow and 
limited powers.  This debate often plays out in interpretations of the 
Commerce Clause.  In cases such as United States v. Darby7 and Wickard v. 
Filburn,8 the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a nationalistic view of this clause, 
holding that Congress has the power to pass laws regulating activity that 
“substantially affect” interstate commerce.9  Although this interpretive view is 
still good law, subsequent cases, particularly during the Rehnquist Court, 
have rejected congressional commerce power in regulating the possession of 
guns10 or gender-motivated violence.11  Commerce clause cases are often the 
most noted in the Court’s jurisprudence over federalism. 
The most recent case concerning congressional power National 
Federation of International Business v. Sebelius12 reveals the way in which 
  
7. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).  
8. 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
9. See, e.g., Wickard, 317 U.S. at 120 (stating that federal commerce clause power is 
“embracing and penetrating” and that “effective restraints on its exercise must proceed 
from political rather than from judicial processes”); Darby, 312 U.S. at 124 (stating that 
the Tenth Amendment is a “truism” and does not alter the idea that there are no 
substantive limits on congressional commerce clause power). 
10. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
11. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
12. 567 U.S. 519 (2012). 
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justices disagree about the scope of this power.  In Sebelius, Chief Justice 
Roberts upheld the individual mandate in the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act as a part of Congress’s taxing and spending power.  But 
along with the other conservative justices, he made clear that the mandate was 
not a permissible exercise of the commerce clause power, because “Congress 
has never attempted to rely on that power to compel individuals not engaged 
in commerce to purchase an unwanted product.”13  Justice Thomas, in 
dissent, takes an even narrower view of Congress’s power under this clause.  
Justice Thomas reasons that “the very notion of a ‘substantial effects’ test 
under the Commerce Clause is inconsistent with the original understanding 
of Congress’s powers and with this Court’s early Commerce Clause cases.”14  
Justice Thomas would roll back the earlier cases of Darby and Wickard that 
had expanded congressional power. 
This debate over the scope of Congress’s power is a longstanding one, 
going at least as far back as M‘Culloch v. Maryland,15 where Chief Justice 
Marshall held that Congress had the implied power to charter a bank.  In 
Sebelius, Chief Justice Roberts references M‘Culloch saying: “Nearly two 
centuries ago, Chief Justice Marshall observed that ‘the question respecting 
the extent of the powers actually granted’ to the Federal Government ‘is 
perpetually arising, and will probably continue to arise, as long as our system 
shall exist.’”16  This debate about powers will persist as justices align 
themselves either with nationalists or those committed to states’ rights, like, 
as we shall see, the statesmen who were debating the Constitution at the 
Philadelphia Convention. 
In addition to the scope of federal power, debates in this area are often 
about the nature of state power as well.  Consider U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. 
Thornton17 where the Court held that states do not have the power to add to 
the standing qualifications of members of Congress.  The majority and dissent 
in that case both looked to the text of the Tenth Amendment, the historical 
record of the Constitutional Convention, and the structure of the Constitution 
in deciding whether Arkansas had the power, in effect, to impose term limits 
on its own federal representatives and senators. 
  
13. Id. at 549. 
14. Id. at 708 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Morrison, 529 U.S. at 627 (Thomas, J., 
concurring)). 
15. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
16. Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 533–34 (quoting M‘Culloch, 17 U.S. at 405). 
17. 514 U.S. 779 (1995). 
The Two Foundings  117 
 
 
Writing for the liberal justices, Justice Stevens argued that the people of 
the United States, not individual states, have the power to add to the standing 
qualification for that state’s congressional members.  Justice Stevens limited 
the power of states, by making clear “that the right to choose representatives 
belongs not to the States, but to the people.”18  Hence Justice Stevens adopted 
a nationalistic view of the Constitution. 
In contrast, writing for the conservative justices, Justice Thomas argued: 
“The ultimate source of the Constitution’s authority is the consent of the 
people of each individual State, not the consent of the undifferentiated people 
of the Nation as a whole.”19  He interpreted the Constitution as contemplating 
an expansive view of state power in the area of qualifications.  Justice Thomas 
highlights a state-centered view of the Constitution.   
This debate between nationalists and those committed to states’ rights 
reveals contradictory visions of the Constitution.  The former camp is often 
sympathetic to an expansive notion of congressional power and a limited role 
for states whereas the latter favors a limited notion of this power and a more 
expansive role for states. 
B. The Debate Over Rights 
In addition to the constitutional debate over powers, there is a parallel 
debate over rights.  Here, the debate is often framed as one between 
originalism and a moral or philosophic reading.  In focusing on these two 
types of interpretive frameworks, we recognize that there are, of course, 
others including textualism, pragmatism, and doctrinalism.  Even between 
originalism and a moral reading, scholars sometimes argue that in one sense, 
everyone is an originalist and simply disagrees about what the constitutional 
text publicly meant at the time it was framed and ratified.20  Because this Essay 
is not about deciding which interpretive theory is the best or more correct one 
(the more familiar focus of scholarly work), we operate on the assumption 
that there are crucial differences in how judges, scholars, and practitioners 
understand what the Constitution means with regards to rights.21  This is why 
we focus specially on originalism and a moral reading, because these two 
  
18. Id. at 820–21. 
19. Id. at 846 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
20. See Fleming, supra note 5.  
21. We agree with Fleming that downplaying this disagreement “may obscure our 
differences more than elucidate common ground.”  Fleming, supra note 5, at 1788. 
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frameworks typically generate the most contrary conclusions in any given 
case. 
These frameworks, understood as ideal types, give very different answers 
to what the Constitution means.  Originalists generally look to the past 
whereas moral readers look to the present in deciding the scope and existence 
of rights.  What did “cruel and unusual punishments” mean in the 
eighteenth century?  What did “equal protection” mean in the nineteenth 
century?  These questions, which look to the past, are the bread and butter of 
an originalist methodology.  This methodology holds that the death penalty 
does not violate a right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, 
because the historical, public meaning of that phrase did not consider such a 
penalty to be cruel or unusual.22  Similarly, this methodology holds that sex or 
sexual orientation discrimination is not a violation of equal protection, 
because the meaning of “equal protection” in the nineteenth century only 
concerned race, not these other classifications.23  This framework considers 
the Constitution as a static document.  The Constitution’s value for 
originalists is that the Constitution does not change—unless formally 
amended by the people.24 
Justices who adhere to originalism, such as Justices Scalia, Rehnquist, 
and Roberts, often affirm, in turn, a historically grounded test for 
determining substantive due process rights.  For instance, in Obergefell v. 
Hodges,25 Justice Roberts argues, in dissent, that in deciding whether bans on 
gay marriage violate an implied right to marry, the Court must ensure that, at 
the very least, such a right is “objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation’s 
history and tradition.”26 
If originalists understand the meaning of constitutional rights by 
looking to the past, moral readers, in contrast, argue judges should look not 
  
22. See generally Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L REV. 849, 853 
(1989) (“At an even more general theoretical level, originalism seems to me more 
compatible with the nature and purpose of a Constitution in a democratic system.”). 
23. Antonin Scalia, U.S. Supreme Court Justice, Address at the Woodrow Wilson International 
Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C. (Mar. 14, 2005), http://www.cfif.org/htdocs/ 
freedomline/current/guest_commentary/scalia-constitutional-speech.htm [http://perma.cc/ 
WT8Q-C4TN]. 
24. See generally KEITH WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL 
MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 3 (1999) (“I intend to demonstrate 
that originalism is the method most consistent with the judicial effort to interpret the 
written constitutional text and that an originalist jurisprudence facilitates the realization 
of a political system grounded on popular sovereignty.”).  
25. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
26. Id. at 2618 (Roberts, J., dissenting) (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 52 U.S. 702, 
720–21 (1997)). 
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just to history but to moral principles that place the Constitution in its best 
light.  Justice Brennan describes this approach as interpreting the document’s 
“majestic generalities,” such as “cruel and unusual” and “equal protection,” in 
a way that “account[s] for the existence of these substantive value choices, 
and . . . accept[s] the ambiguity inherent in the effort to apply them to 
modern circumstances.”27  Justice Brennan, in turn, would read the Cruel and 
Unusual Punishments Clause to forbid the death penalty, because it violates a 
basic commitment to “human dignity.”28  For the moral or philosophic 
reader, we have those rights that the phrases and words of the Constitution 
affirm in principle.  This understanding of principle is not grounded in a 
historical practice or what the words meant some hundred or so years ago.  
This approach is grounded in the best understanding of the Constitution 
given the present state of affairs.  Whereas for originalism the truth of what 
the Constitution means is a backwards-looking question, for the moral reader 
who advocates for a more living Constitution, it is a forward or present-day 
inquiry. 
Exemplifying this approach, the majority opinion in Obergefell written 
by Justice Kennedy points out that “[t]he nature of injustice is that we may 
not always see it in our own times.”29  Like Justice Brennan, Justice Kennedy 
views the majestic generalities of the Constitution to mean that the Framers 
“did not presume to know the extent of freedom in all of its dimensions, and 
so they entrusted to future generations a charter protecting the right of all 
persons to enjoy liberty as we learn its meaning.”30  Moral readers, then, 
endorse a dynamic view of interpretation, one that is not hamstrung by the 
past but informed by the present. 
C. How to Explain These Debates? 
This cursory description of debates over powers and rights reveals that 
these interpretive frameworks do not merely emphasize different perspectives 
  
27. William J. Brennan, U.S. Supreme Court Justice, Constitutional Interpretation, Address 
to the Test and Teaching Symposium at Georgetown University (Oct. 12, 1985), 
http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/constitutional-interpretation 
[http://perma.cc/ECW2-CJ5L].  See generally STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: 
INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 11–12 (2005) (“I shall link use of the 
theme [of active liberty] to a broader interpretive approach that places considerable 
importance upon consequences; and I shall contrast that approach with others that 
place greater weight upon language, history and tradition.”). 
28. Brennan, supra note 27. 
29. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2598. 
30. Id. 
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on the meaning of the Constitution—they present diametrically opposite ones.  
The nationalistic framework seeks an expansive view of congressional power; 
its states’ right counterpart a restrictive view.  While an originalist reading of 
the Constitution interprets rights by looking to the past, a moral reading does 
so by looking to the present.  Moreover, nationalists believe they have the 
correct view of the Constitution, and proponents of states’ rights believe they 
have the correct view.  The same goes for moral readers and originalists.   
Simultaneously, those who are originalists generally treat Congress as 
having limited powers under the Constitution.  Those who are moral readers 
generally treat Congress as having expansive powers under the document.  
That is, those who view the document as a nationalistic charter will often 
interpret constitutional rights in a dynamic way, whereas those who view the 
document as more state-focused will usually interpret such rights in a fixed or 
static way.  This may be an obvious point but one that legal scholars have not 
explained. 
II. THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL 
The foregoing summary, then, poses the motivating puzzle of this Essay.  
Contradictory views and understanding of the Constitution exist.  How do we 
explain the fact that the Constitution means such contradictory things?  How 
do we explain the coincident dichotomy between a nationalist view/moral 
reading on one hand and a state-centered view/originalism on the other?  
Legal scholars do not spend much, if any, time answering these questions.  Political 
scientists, on the other hand, do provide an explanation for this disagreement: 
Drawing primarily on empirical assessments, they argue that disagreement arises 
because of political ideology.31  A conservative justice, generally appointed by 
a Republican president, will take a state-centered view of the Constitution 
while also endorsing originalism.  A liberal justice, generally appointed by a 
Democratic president, will take a nationalistic view and endorse a moral 
  
31. See, e.g., MICHAEL A. BAILEY & FORREST MALTZMAN, THE CONSTRAINED COURT: LAW, 
POLITICS, AND THE DECISIONS JUSTICES MAKE (2011); LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE 
CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998); Brandon L. Bartels, The Constraining Capacity of Legal 
Doctrine on the U.S. Supreme Court, 103 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 474 (2009); Andrew D. 
Martin, Statutory Battles and Constitutional Wars: Congress and the Supreme Court, in 
INSTITUTIONAL GAMES AND THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 3 (James R. Rogers et al. eds., 
2006); Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via 
Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953–1999, 10 POL. ANALYSIS 
134 (2002); Christopher Zorn & Jennifer Barnes Bowie, Ideological Influences on 
Decision Making in the Federal Judicial Hierarchy: An Empirical Assessment, 72 J. POL. 
1212 (2010). 
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reading.  This explanation is noteworthy for generally ignoring the law and 
even, more glaringly, the Constitution itself, in favor of a primarily political 
explanation.32 
A. Ideology Not Law 
In their classic work on judicial decisionmaking, Jeffrey A. Segal and 
Harold J. Spaeth contend that the Supreme Court justices “have such virtually 
untrammeled policymaking authority.”33  This attitudinal model of the Court 
views justices as miniature policymakers, deciding cases on the basis of their 
own preferred ideology and politics, generally unconstrained by legal 
considerations.34  Scholars have shown that this ideological discretion is, 
unsurprisingly, most prominent at the Supreme Court.35 
In fact, political scientists who study judicial behavior have plotted the 
ideological bent of individual justices over time from 1937 to 2016.36  They 
show, for instance, that from 1985 onwards, Justice Thomas is one of the most 
conservative justices on the modern court, and Justices Brennan and Marshall 
have been some of the most liberal.37  This does not mean that ideology 
explains every decision a justice may make.  Justice Scalia, for instance, 
sometimes decides criminal due process cases in a way that is ideologically 
liberal.38  But this does not detract from the fact that after Justice Thomas, 
  
32.   According to Jeffrey A. Segal and Harold J. Spaeth, the legal model for adjudicating 
cases holds that “the decisions of the Court are substantially influenced by the facts of 
the case in light of the plain meaning of statutes and the Constitution, the intent of the 
Framers, and/or precedence.”  JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME 
COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 48 (2002).  And as we outline in Part I, 
jurists, scholars, and practitioners disagree about what various clauses in the 
Constitution mean.  In contrast, according to Segal and Spaeth the attitudinal model for 
adjudicating cases holds that “the Supreme Court decides disputes in light of the facts of 
the case vis-á-vis the ideological attitudes and values of the justices.”  Id. at 86.  
33. Id. at 12.  
34. See, e.g., EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 31; GLENDON SCHUBERT, THE JUDICIAL MIND 
REVISITED: PSYCHOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF SUPREME COURT IDEOLOGY (1974); Martin, supra 
note 31. 
35. LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL 
JUDGES: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RATIONAL CHOICE (2013); Zorn & 
Bowie, supra note 31. 
36. Measures, MARTIN-QUINN SCORES, http://mqscores.wustl.edu/measures.php [http://perma.cc/ 
JJ85-SE9J]. 
37. Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov 
Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953–1999, 10 POL. ANALYSIS 134, 146 
(2002).  
38. See, e.g., Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013) (holding that use of a trained 
narcotics dog at the front of a suspect’s door constitutes a search under the Fourth 
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Justice Scalia is, according to political scientists, the most conservative of 
modern justices.39 
B. A Political, not Legal, Debate 
In one sense, this ideological account is not surprising.  As a general 
matter, we expect Republican presidents to nominate conservative jurists and 
Democratic presidents to nominate those who are liberal.  As political 
scientists Lee Epstein, Andrew Martin, and Kevin Quinn argue, the recent 
confirmation of Justice Gorsuch by the current Republican administration 
reveals the explanatory force of the attitudinal model.40 
The attitudinal model reduces debates over constitutional powers and 
rights to be about politics.  According to this model, the reason that those 
justices who are nationalists are also moral readers is based on political 
ideology.  Just as liberals (current Democrats) favor expansive congressional 
power and social rights regarding sexuality and reproduction, so too do 
justices who ascribe to a nationalistic view of the Constitution and who 
deploy a moral or philosophic reading of the text.  Likewise, under this model, 
political ideology explains why justices who are advocates of states’ rights are 
also originalists.  Just as conservatives (current Republicans) favor limited 
congressional power and limited social rights regarding sexuality and 
reproduction, so too do justices who ascribe to a states’ rights view of the 
Constitution and who deploy an originalist reading of the text.   
More than connecting these divergent interpretations of the 
Constitution to political ideology, the attitudinal model places politics before 
the law.  For instance, the work by Epstein, Martin, and Quinn mentioned 
above regarding Justice Gorsuch makes no mention of originalism, a moral 
reading, or even the Constitution.41  This explanatory model reduces legal 
debates over powers and rights discussed above to mere politics.   
It is hard to deny the force of this model, because it provides an 
explanation for why these divergent theories of what the Constitution means 
  
Amendment, requiring probable cause).  Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion 
joined by Justices Thomas, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan.  Justice Alito wrote the 
dissent joined by Justices Roberts, Kennedy, and Breyer.  See id. 
39. Id. 
40. See LEE EPSTEIN, ANDREW D. MARTIN & KEVIN QUINN, PRESIDENT-ELECT TRUMP AND HIS 
POSSIBLE JUSTICES app., 8 fig.2 (2016), http://pdfserver.amlaw.com/nlj/ 
PresNominees2.pdf [http://perma.cc/MA7J-GQR4] (showing that Gorsuch is 
ideologically conservative). 
41. See id. 
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actually exist.  Although this is beneficial for the discipline of political science 
(and empirical work in American politics in particular), it poses an acute 
challenge to legal scholars.  If the underlying disagreement is genuinely one 
that is based on politics, this delegitimizes the explanatory force of the 
Constitution.  Unsurprisingly, law schools do not teach the attitudinal model.  
(Law schools simply teach students the legal model for adjudicating cases 
with its varying theories of constitutional interpretation, without attention to 
why such variance exists.)  Rather than fully explaining the puzzle of 
constitutional interpretation, the attitudinal model, in a certain way, 
exacerbates it.  This model entails that the debates outlined above have 
nothing to do with the Constitution.  What, then, is the connection between 
the Constitution and what legal scholars, judges, and practitioners who 
constantly engage in these interpretive debates are doing?  If the debates over 
interpretation are reducible only to political differences, as the attitudinal 
model suggests, the very idea that these debates are about the Constitution 
makes little sense. 
III. EXPLAINING THE PUZZLE 
We offer here an endogenous, legal explanation of the power/rights and 
moral reading/originalism debate based on the two-foundings thesis.  This 
thesis contends that the Constitution itself is a bifurcated text, one that 
affirms the establishment of two distinct and conflicting governments. 
The first founding started in 1776, when the thirteen original colonies 
declared themselves in the Declaration of Independence to be “Free and 
Independent “42 and came together, each with their sovereignties fully intact, 
to adopt and ratify the first constitution of the United States, the Articles of 
Confederation and Perpetual Union (the Articles of Confederation or the 
Articles), in 1781.  The first founding created a league of nations that 
assiduously guarded the sovereignty of states.  The first founding, in turn, 
embraced a decided bias for states’ rights, and correspondingly, an 
understanding of the union as a charter of ancient rights. 
The second founding in 1789 radically overhauled this older conception 
of union as merely a compact among thirteen sovereign states.  The second 
founding created a new charter or compact, what we know as the 
Constitution.  This document created a nationalized “We the People”43 
  
42. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 31 (U.S. 1776). 
43. U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
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aggregated across state lines with a federal government that would represent 
Americans collectively at the national level.  With the second founding and 
the ratification of the Constitution, the United States became much more 
than a league of nations.  As the Preamble of the Constitution promised, it 
was, “a more perfect Union” committed to a more centralized federalism than 
what was spawned at the first founding.  Crucially, however, elements of the 
first founding, such as the commitment to states’ rights in the composition of 
the U.S. Senate and the Tenth Amendment, were incorporated in the text of 
the Constitution.  This is why we argue that the two-foundings thesis points 
to two divergent ways of understanding the Constitution—ways that align 
with extant debates over powers and rights, moral reading and originalism. 
A. First Founding (1776–81) and Second Founding (1787–89) 
When the Constitution was ratified, states had already been established.44  
The Constitution did not create or set up state governments.  With regard to the 
Constitution, states are pre-political.  Their existence and the nature of their 
legitimacy is assumed in the structure, text, and theory of the Constitution.  
These governments arose when the Declaration of Independence declared, in part, 
that the thirteen states were “Free and Independent States.”45  These states, in 
turn, set up the Articles of Confederation.  This confederation preserved the 
autonomy of states, making clear, in fact, that each “state retains its 
sovereignty, freedom, and independence.”46  What were once colonies of the 
Crown became free and independent states.  The first founding explains 
the existence and legitimacy of state governments as preexisting units that 
had to be incorporated in the second founding. 
The Constitution, which was the culmination of the second founding, 
established the federal or national government.  Before the Constitution, no 
such government existed.  The government during the first founding was 
  
44. As former colonies of England, the states declared their independence in 1776.  THE 
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 31 (“That these united Colonies are, and of Right 
ought to be Free and Independent States.”); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (“The 
Number of Representatives shall not exceed one for every thirty Thousand, but each 
State shall have at Least one Representative; and until such enumeration shall be made, 
the State of New Hampshire shall be entitled to chuse three, Massachusetts eight, 
Rhode-Island and Providence Plantations one, Connecticut five, New-York six, New 
Jersey four, Pennsylvania eight, Delaware one, Maryland six, Virginia ten, North 
Carolina five, South Carolina five, and Georgia three.”).  In listing the original thirteen 
states, the Constitution assumes that these states were already established. 
45. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 31. 
46. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781 art. II. 
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always styled “the United States, in Congress assembled,”47 and there was no 
people in the national sense, but only “the people of the different States in this 
Union.”48  At the second founding, “We the People” ordained and established 
“this Constitution of the United States.”49  The United States as a unit came 
into existence when New Hampshire became the ninth state to ratify the 
Constitution.50  The second founding established a union rather than a 
confederation.  Unlike the Articles, which required unanimous consent of the 
state legislatures in order to amend that document,51 the Constitution 
required consent of the conventions in at least nine states.52  What this 
critically indicates is that absolute state sovereignty, a doctrine from the first 
founding, had become attenuated in the second founding. 
B. The Constitution as a Clash of Foundings 
But attenuation is not the same as displacement, hence the explanatory 
power of the two-foundings thesis in explaining both sides in the debates 
about powers and rights.  Although the Constitution established the national 
government, it also reaffirmed core tenets of the first founding, drawing on 
states to establish the federal government while also guaranteeing their 
sovereignty.   
The view that there was a single, monolithic founding treats the 
Constitution as “split[ting] the atom of sovereignty.”53  In U.S. Term Limits, 
Inc. v. Thornton,54 Justice Kennedy expounds upon this view in the following 
way: 
The resulting Constitution created a legal system unprecedented 
in form and design, establishing two orders of government, each 
with its own direct relationship, its own privity, its own set of 
mutual rights and obligations to the people who sustain it and are 
governed by it.  It is appropriate to recall these origins, which 
  
47. Id. art. II. 
48. Id. art. IV. 
49. U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
50. Id. art. VII (“The Ratification of the Conventions of nine States shall be sufficient for the 
Establishment of this Constitution between the States so ratifying the same.”). 
51. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781 art. XIII (requiring that any alteration “be agreed 
to in a Congress of the United States, and be afterwards confirmed by the legislature of 
every State”). 
52. U.S. CONST. art. VII (“The Ratification of the Conventions of nine States shall be sufficient 
for the Establishment of this Constitution between the States so ratifying the same.”). 
53. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
54. 514 U.S. 779. 
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instruct us as to the nature of the two different governments 
created and confirmed by the Constitution.55 
This view posits that the Constitution created two different governments, the 
state government and the federal government, and that all of this was enacted 
in a single moment in 1787.  The conventional view thus treats the 
Constitution as a result of a single founding.   
Even if this view is not stated explicitly, it is often assumed.  For example, 
Gordon Wood’s classic book The Creation of the American Republic, 1776–
1787 analyzes this time frame as establishing a single American government 
(the “American Republic”).56  Akhil Amar views the American founding as a 
single event: “It started with a bang.”57  This entails that there was only one 
“it,” one government that was created or established by the Constitution.  If 
scholars do discuss a second founding, it is often in the context of the Civil 
War and Reconstruction, where the civil rights amendments of the 
nineteenth century refounded the nature and scope of the United States.58 
This Essay argues that sovereignty was already split before the second 
founding.  There was a beginning before what we typically take to be the beginning.  
When the Constitution took effect, it was affirming two distinct foundings.  The 
two-founding thesis challenges the splitting metaphor.  Rather than splitting 
sovereignty, the Constitution importantly overlapped one sovereignty or 
government (the United States) over another (the preexisting sovereignty of the 
states).  It layered one government upon another.  This is obvious once one 
appreciates the role of states in the Constitution.  It is not just that the 
Constitution required ratification by conventions in states.59  When it comes 
to democratic representation at the national level, such representation must 
first go through states.  Both houses of Congress are composed of members 
that are selected within each state.  Moreover, according to the Constitution, 
only those who are qualified to vote for “the most numerous Branch of the 
State Legislature” may vote in federal elections for their Senator or 
Representative in the House.60  This is why there is no explicit right to vote in 
  
55. Id. at 838–39 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
56. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–1787 (1998). 
57. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 5 (2005). 
58. See generally 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 351 (2000). 
59. U.S. CONST. art. VII; id. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (“[T]he Electors in each State shall have the 
Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State 
Legislature.”). 
60.  Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (“The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen 
every second Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors in each State shall 
have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State 
Legislature.”); U.S. CONST. amend. XVII (“The Senate of the United States shall be 
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the Constitution.  In fact, how the president is selected, whether by popular 
vote (as is the current procedure) or some other procedure, is also determined 
by states.61  And any constitutional act that amends the document requires 
assent by states.62  The spirit of the Articles of Confederation lives on. 
Tellingly, the Constitution does not define what a state is.  Although the 
document lists the original thirteen in Article I, and outlines how new states 
are admitted, there is no discussion about the nature or sovereign status of 
states.  This is because the Constitution assumes the existence and legitimacy 
of states.  This is because the Federalists63 were not working with tabula rasa at 
the Philadelphia Convention.  By playing such a crucial role in establishing 
and maintaining the federal or national government (which did not exist 
before), the Constitution overlays this new government onto an older 
arrangement.  This is the distinctive way in which the two foundings are 
present in the Constitution.  Alexis de Tocqueville famously said that the 
Constitution was an “incomplete national government.”64  This fact 
distinguishes “the Federal Constitution of the United States of America from 
All Other Federal Constitutions.”65  James Madison himself acknowledged 
this in The Federalist Papers, Number 39, when he deftly noted that the 
Constitution was “partly federal and partly national.”66 
Scholars often consider federalism along with separation of powers as a 
structural aspect of the U.S. government.  Just as the Constitution divides 
power horizontally—among the legislative, executive, and judicial 
  
composed of two Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof, for six years; 
and each Senator shall have one vote. The electors in each State shall have the 
qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State 
legislatures.”).  Amendments XV, XIX, and XXVI limit this power by prohibiting states 
from discriminating on the basis of race, sex, or age (over eighteen) in voting.  The Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment also provides a more general 
limitation on state action. 
61.  Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (“Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof 
may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and 
Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress . . . .”). 
62. Id. art. V. 
63. The Federalists were the proponents of the new Constitution, the most ardent of whom 
were the men who helped to formulate and voted in favor of the Constitution drafted at 
the Philadelphia Convention.  They included among their ranks Alexander Hamilton, 
their leader; George Washington, president of the Convention; Benjamin Franklin; 
Edmund Randolph; and of course Hamilton’s coauthors of The Federalist Papers, James 
Madison and John Jay. 
64. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 146 (Henry Reeve trans., Bantam 
Books 2000) (1835).  
65. Id. at 149. 
66. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39 (James Madison). 
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branches—it also divides power vertically between the federal and state 
government.  The two-foundings thesis challenges this neat view.  It proposes 
that federalism is not just the simple division of power between the federal 
and state governments.  It is, in essence, a clash of the principles of two 
foundings.  The Constitution both creates a new, national government, with 
its attendant powers, and affirms the legitimacy of state governments—
governments whose existence preceded the Constitution.  This clash of 
sovereignties represents the central feature and tension within the 
Constitution, one that as we shall see, offers justificatory fodder for both sides 
of the powers/rights and moral reading/originalism debates. 
C. Anti-Federalists Versus Federalists 
This tension between a moral reading and originalism or between a 
nationalistic view of the Constitution and a more state-centered view is no 
more evident than in the debates between the Federalists and Anti-Federalists 
over the Constitution’s ratification.  The debates over powers and rights we 
are having today then, are but the modern incarnation of an ancient lovers’ 
quarrel.  The Federalists sought to create a new, national government—one 
that would be more powerful, as outlined in The Federalist Papers, because 
the Articles of Confederation were insufficient to ensure the “preservation of the 
Union.”67  The Anti-Federalists68 sought to preserve the status quo, to 
constrain this national government’s power.  This is why, for instance, the 
Anti-Federalists ultimately succeeded in passing the Bill of Rights, the first 
ten amendments to the Constitution that sought to limit the power of 
Congress.  They also ensured, as outlined above, that states would be the only 
conduit by which “We the People” could exercise its national powers. 
This Essay does not seek to provide a comprehensive account of these 
ratification debates (this is well-chartered scholarly territory).  Rather, we 
seek to make a conceptual point that these debates map onto our two-
foundings thesis.  Whereas the Anti-Federalists privileged the first founding 
and its principles, their Federalist contemporaries privileged the second 
founding. 
  
67. THE FEDERALIST NO. 15 (Alexander Hamilton).  
68. For accounts of Anti-Federalist political thought, see 1–7 THE COMPLETE ANTI-
FEDERALIST (Herbert J. Storing & Murray Dry eds., 1981); SAUL CORNELL, THE OTHER 
FOUNDERS: ANTI-FEDERALISM AND THE DISSENTING TRADITION IN AMERICA, 1788–1828 
(1999); JACKSON TURNER MAIN, THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS: CRITICS OF THE CONSTITUTION 
(1961); and DAVID J. SIEMERS, THE ANTIFEDERALISTS: MEN OF GREAT FAITH AND 
FORBEARANCE (2003). 
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The Federalists and Anti-Federalists had different visions of political 
philosophy.  The Federalists were not as confident about human nature as the 
Anti-Federalists were, at least in the small republic.69  This was, in part, 
because cultural homogeneity, the checking influence of friends and 
neighbors, and the limited ambit of sympathies that would have sufficed in the 
Anti-Federalists’ model would simply not apply to a large area that would 
become the United States.70 
Whereas the Federalists turned to a complex Newtonian machine to find 
a modern republican virtue out of contesting ambitions, the Anti-Federalists 
were traditionalists committed to classical republican virtue.71  These 
traditionalists were principled philosophers who sought a virtuous republic, 
one that was only possible in a small, homogenous sphere.72 
The Federalists focused on heterogeneity and a larger republic.  They 
preferred a trusteeship rather than a mirroring model of representation, 
which prescribed that representatives ought not simply to mimic their 
constituents’ preferences (as the Anti-Federalists suggested) but should distill 
the will of the people from the turbulent passions often found in a 
democracy.73  According to Wood, the Federalists were pragmatists who 
adopted a “more modern and more realistic sense of political behavior.”74  For the 
Federalists, man-made institutions, a new “science of politics,”75 now had to do 
the work when virtue was sufficient before.  Ambition counteracting ambition76 
  
69. As Madison observed in Federalist Number 10: “[A] Society, consisting of a small 
number of citizens . . . can admit of no cure for the mischiefs of faction . . . . [T]here is 
nothing to check the inducements to sacrifice the weaker party.”  THE FEDERALIST NO. 
10, at 46 (James Madison) (Bantam Books 1982). 
70. As Melancton Smith had argued in favor of the Anti-Federalist model, representatives 
ought to be “a true picture of the people; possess the knowledge of their circumstances 
and their wants; sympathize in all their distresses, and be disposed to seek their true 
interests.”  Melancton Smith, Address at the New York Ratification Convention (June 
21, 1788), reprinted in 6 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 68, at 157.  
71. MICHAEL KAMMEN, A MACHINE THAT WOULD GO OF ITSELF: THE CONSTITUTION IN 
AMERICAN CULTURE (1986). 
72. LIM, supra note 6, at 11 (outlining the way in which there exists a Federalist and Anti-
Federalist philosophy of union, liberty, truth, and republicanism). 
73. See for example, Madison’s reminder, in Federalist Number 49, about the “danger of 
disturbing the public tranquility by interesting too strongly the public passions” and his 
argument against “a frequent reference of constitutional questions, to the decision of the 
whole society.”  THE FEDERALIST NO. 49, at 256 (James Madison) (Bantam Books 1982).  
74. WOOD, supra note 56, at 606. 
75. THE FEDERALIST NO. 9 (Alexander Hamilton). 
76. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison). 
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sought to replace the older, homogenous idea of virtue advocated by the Anti-
Federalists.77 
The Anti-Federalists were defenders of the “league of friendship” 
codified in the Articles of Confederation, where the sovereignty of the states 
remained mostly intact, like the nations that constitute today’s European 
Union.78  They understood the new or centralized federalism that the 
Federalists proposed as one of consolidation, anathema to the sovereignty of 
the states.  As one Anti-Federalist put it, “the good opinion I have of the frame 
and composition as well of the Confederation as the several state 
Constitutions: and that they are, if administered upon republican principles, 
the greatest blessings we enjoy; and the danger I apprehend of the one 
proposed is, that it will become the greatest curse.”79 
These dueling visions of politics map onto the first and second 
foundings.  The first founders—the Anti-Federalists—who held on to the 
older conception of a confederated union based on the relatively unfettered 
sovereignty of the states included Patrick Henry,80 Richard Henry Lee,81 and 
George Clinton.82  They harkened back to the status quo of states-centered 
government, homogeneity, the politics of the past, and a limited role for the 
national government.83  The second founders, including Alexander 
  
77.  We realize that many people, including slaves, the poor, and women, were governed less 
by virtue and more by oppression or hierarchy at this time in history.  Our singular 
focus on the founders’ perspective is simply to tease out the resulting legal frameworks 
for governance which now form the bases of the two principal methods of constitutional 
interpretation.  This Essay, then, does not attempt to explore the important socio-
economic, political, and material conditions that motivated the founders in their 
opposing viewpoints of the government. 
78. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. III. 
79. Sidney Essay II (Feb. 21, 1788), reprinted in 6 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra 
note 68, at 97. 
80. Patrick Henry refused his appointment as a delegate to the Philadelphia Convention 
because “he smelt a rat.”  Don Higgenbotham, Virginia’s Trinity of Immortals: 
Washington, Jefferson, and Henry, and the Story of Their Fractured Relationships, 23 J. 
EARLY REPUBLIC 521, 527 (2003). 
81. Most historians agree that Richard Henry Lee was the author of a major series of Anti-
Federalist writings using the pseudonym Federal Farmer.  Gordon S. Wood, The 
Authorship of The Letters of the Federal Farmer, 31 WM. & MARY Q. 299, 299 (1974). 
82. George Clinton was the Governor of New York who feared “the undue and extensive 
powers vested in the central government.”  JOHN P. KAMINSKI, GEORGE CLINTON: 
YEOMAN POLITICIAN OF THE NEW REPUBLIC 158 (1993). 
83. The Anti-Federalists were men like Robert Yates and John Lansing who, when it became 
apparent that the delegates at the Philadelphia were attempting to overhaul rather than 
amend the Articles of Confederation, “left in disgust.”  SIEMERS, supra note 68, at 22.  
Using the pseudonym, Brutus, Cecelia Kenyon tells us that “the Anti-Federalists had no 
publicist more able than Robert Yates.”  CECELIA M. KENYON, THE ANTIFEDERALISTS 323 
(1966). 
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Hamilton, John Adams, George Washington, and James Madison, 
emphasized a forward-looking politics, a strong national government, and a 
heterogeneous, large republic.84 
D. A Legal Debate About Two Views of the Constitution 
Once we realize that the Constitution itself is an affirmation of two distinct 
foundings, the existence of debates over powers and rights and moral reading and 
originalism is no longer a puzzle.  Each founding speaks to a different, even 
contradictory, way of understanding or viewing the Constitution.  This is easiest to 
see in the debate over powers.  Nationalists emphasize the second founding 
whereas those who care about states’ rights emphasize the first founding.   
The second founders sought to create a federal or national government 
that would, as the instructions given to the Philadelphia Convention that 
drafted the Constitution specify, “render the federal constitution adequate to 
the exigencies of Government [and] the preservation of the Union.”85  The second 
founders were deliberate about expanding the powers of the federal government.  
The Articles of Confederation did not create a separate national 
government.  For instance, the “Congress assembled” had no distinct power 
to tax or to raise an army, no distinct, unitary executive branch that would be 
“Commander in Chief” of the military, or no separate judicial branch.86  The 
Constitution, in contrast, established a distinct national government with a 
legislative branch that has the power to tax and raise an Army87, a unitary 
executive who is Commander in Chief,88 and a separate judicial branch.89  If 
  
  Another prominent Anti-Federalist was George Mason, who refused to sign the 
proposed Constitution at Philadelphia.  He lamented the absence of a bill of rights and 
also warned against the dangers of a standing army.  See George Mason, Objections to 
This Constitution of Government, in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION DEBATE 173–75 (Ralph Ketcham ed., Signet Classics 
2003) (1986). 
84. The Federalists promulgated a vision of “independence, growth in national power, and 
prosperity, all within a federal system of government retaining the states and deriving its 
authority from the people, but also competent to all the needs and exigencies of 
respectable, energetic nationhood.”  THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION DEBATES, supra note 83, at 20. 
85. REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS IN CONGRESS, FEBRUARY 21, 1787, reprinted in H.R. DOC. NO. 
389, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 46 (1926). 
86. See THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781. 
87. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
88. Id. art. II. 
89. Id. art. III.  The Federalists had come to Philadelphia because the Articles of 
Confederation had failed, in their minds, to supply a robust national government to 
address the needs of their time.  Indeed, what was created, a “Congress assembled,” was 
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the second founding was in some regard a conscious repudiation of the first, 
this, in turn, points to an interpretation of the Constitution that privileges the 
national or federal government and an expansive reading of its powers.  
Liberal justices who interpret the Commerce Clause broadly, for instance, are 
modern day harbingers of the second founding.  They come from a long line 
of descendants of Publius, from John Marshall, to Salmon P. Chase, to Louis 
Brandeis.  They emphasize the powers of the federal government and the 
importance of a strong national government to address problems that arise in 
a large republic. 
The first founders, in contrast, sought to limit the power of the federal 
government.  They were skeptical of this power, seeking to ensure that states 
retained their sovereignty and security.90  Again, consider the way in which 
states are necessary conduits for citizens to act as “We the People.”  The first 
founders saw the national behemoth, or “the heterogeneous phantom,”91 as a 
problem, locating the true commitment to republican government in the 
states.  This is why the first founders sought a Bill of Rights.  Such a Bill was 
meant to curtail the power of a powerful national congress: “Congress shall 
make no law . . . .”92  The Tenth Amendment, in particular, makes clear that 
powers not delegated to the federal government are “reserved to the States 
respectively, or to the people.”93  Modern conservative justices who interpret 
the Commerce Clause narrowly or privilege states over the federal 
government are disciples of the first founding.  They prioritize the power of 
states and emphasize the limits on what the national government may do.  
They too come from a long line of dissenters echoing the spirit of ‘76, from 
William Johnson, to Roger Taney, to Pierce Butler. 
Both interpretive frameworks, the nationalists and those committed to 
states’ rights, then, are historically justified ways of understanding the 
  
barely a permanent government: it had no distinct power to tax or to raise an army, no 
distinct, unitary executive branch that would be “Commander in Chief” of the military, 
and no separate judicial branch.  As John Jay woefully observed in Federalist Number 4: 
“Leave America divided into thirteen, or if you please into three or four independent 
Governments—what armies could they raise and pay—what fleets could they ever hope 
to have?”  THE FEDERALIST NO. 4, at 14 (John Jay) (Bantam Books 1982). 
90. “The anti-federalists looked to the Classical idealization of the small, pastoral republic 
where virtuous, self reliant citizens managed their own affairs and shunned the power 
and glory of empire.”  THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONVENTION DEBATES, supra note 83, at 17. 
91. MERCY OTIS WARREN, OBSERVATIONS ON THE NEW CONSTITUTION, AND ON THE FEDERAL 
AND STATE CONVENTIONS (1788), reprinted in 4 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra 
note 67, at 276. 
92. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
93. U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
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Constitution.  Neither is groundless or mistaken.  Debates over powers clearly 
reflect two distinct arguments that can be squarely traced back to the two 
foundings.  The debate persists up to this day as the Constitution itself is 
bifurcated.  Most clearly, the Constitution is a text which begins with the creation of 
national powers, and, in the Bill of Rights culminating in the Tenth Amendment, 
resolutely affirms restraints on these powers in defense of states’ rights. 
The two-foundings thesis also explains the interpretive debates over the 
moral reading of rights versus originalism.  The second founders deliberately 
sought to break from the past by creating a national government that would 
not be held hostage by the states.  These founders sought to create a forward-
looking government that would be strong enough to meet new challenges.  
They did conceive of their creation, after all, as “a more perfect Union.”  
Moral readers invoke the second founders by interpreting the Constitution in 
this dynamic way, privileging the present rather than the past, just as the 
second founders understood their project to be an unfolding experiment 
responding to the vicissitudes of modernity. 
Although they do not explicitly connect their argument to the second 
founding, moral readers James Fleming and Sotirios Barber actually look to 
The Federalist Papers and the Preamble to inform their view of the 
Constitution.  They call this view “positive constitutionalism” which, in 
effect, draws on the second founders to explain the legitimacy of a moral 
reading.94  According to Fleming, the moral reader interprets the 
Constitution in a way that “tries to vindicate its expressed claim to be an 
instrument of justice, the general welfare, and the other goods listed in the 
Preamble.”95  Dynamism and a focus on the present are defining 
characteristics of the second founding, and in turn, a moral reading.  A 
commitment to justice and to the general welfare, is predicated on an 
understanding of the Union as a unit and not just a league of distinct nations. 
In contrast, originalists are defenders of the first founding.  Originalists 
seek to look to the past and treat the Constitution as a static document that 
cannot change until formally amended.  Indeed, the original meaning they 
seek to affirm precedes the second founding.  The first founders were 
conservative, committed to principles derived from custom and experience; 
from the state of affairs that preceded the Federalists’ intervention.  They 
favored the smaller, homogenous state-centered communities of the past 
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95. JAMES E. FLEMING, FIDELITY TO OUR IMPERFECT CONSTITUTION: FOR MORAL READINGS 
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rather than a new science of politics.  Similarly, originalists seek to interpret 
the Constitution in a way that preserves the past, treating the original public 
meaning as more important than any present-day concern.  This view of the 
Constitution is backward-looking in the same way that Anti-Federalists 
sought to preserve the past and its focus on a small (states) rather than a large 
(national government) republic.96 
Emphasizing the first founding, and in turn Anti-Federalist thought, is 
to emphasize a conservative ideology, one that seeks to preserve small 
republics over a centralized one.97  This is why the Anti-Federalists were 
partial to what John Kincaid has called a “community of communities” which 
harken back to a United States after the first founding.98  The Anti-Federalists 
advocated for a small rather than a new and expansive republic.  In lamenting 
this focus on the past James Madison in Federalist Number 14 retorts:   
But why is the experiment of an extended republic to be rejected, 
merely because it may comprise what is new?  Is it not the glory of 
the people of America, that, whilst they have paid a decent regard 
to the opinions of former times and other nations, they have not 
suffered a blind veneration for antiquity, for custom, or for names, 
to overrule the suggestions of their own good sense, the knowledge 
of their own situation, and the lessons of their own experience?99 
Originalism seeks to enforce the Constitution in exactly this kind of 
traditional way.  The meaning of the relevant clause or text comes out of the 
historical community that first ratified it.  Originalism venerates the past, in 
line with Anti-Federalist thought and the first founding.  The focus on 
custom and what came before is precisely why those who deploy originalism 
view this theory of interpretation as legitimate and correct.  
  
96. As Jonathan Marshall said: “[I]f America was to be a city upon a hill, the Antifederalists 
seemed to say, then let it be a city renowned for liberty and virtue rather than might and 
extent.”  Jonathan Marshall, Empire or Liberty: The Antifederalists and Foreign Policy, 
1787–1788, 4 J. LIBERTARIAN STUD. 233, 252 (1980). 
97. William Riker has argued that what changed from the first to the second Constitution 
was “peripheralized federalism” to “centralized federalism.”  WILLIAM H. RIKER, 
FEDERALISM: ORIGIN, OPERATION, SIGNIFICANCE 5 (1964). 
98. John Kincaid, Federalism and Community in the American Context, 20 PUBLIUS 69, 71 
(1990).  Kincaid’s account of federalism stands closer to the Anti-Federalist, confederal 
archetype than the Federalist one.  After all, the idea of communitas communitatum, 
though a medieval idea, has, since the early modern era, been almost exclusively used to 
characterize a single state.  On this, see J.N. FIGGIS, STUDIES OF POLITICAL THOUGHT 
FROM GERSON TO GROTIUS, 1414–1625, at 51 (1907). 
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The two-founding thesis, then, also explains why originalists often view 
the Constitution as state-centered and their moral reader counterparts view it 
as nationalistic.  Each set of interpretive frameworks corresponds to the first 
and second foundings respectively.  The first founders looked to the past 
(originalism) and thereby sought to limit the power of the national 
government (state-centered).  The second founders looked to solving the 
problems of the present (moral reading) and thereby sought to establish a 
powerful national government (nation-centered). 
CONCLUSION 
The two-foundings thesis connects the debates over powers and rights to 
the Constitution.  These divergent frameworks for understanding the 
document were present from the very beginning.  Whereas originalists and 
those committed to states’ rights inherit the legacy of the first founding, 
nationalists and moral readers inherit the legacy of the second founding.  No 
framework is the singularly correct one, because both foundings are central to 
the Constitution.  The two sides in the debates over powers and rights are 
both legitimate when viewed through a historical lens.  Both views speak to a 
partial and defensible truth about the Constitution. 
Perhaps our veneration of a single founding and a monolithic set of 
founders has hidden this fact from us.  To fully appreciate the way in which 
the Constitution overlapped one sovereign over another is to understand and 
thereby explain the puzzle of constitutional interpretation—in the sense that 
these debates cannot be resolved one way or the other.  Just as the 
Constitution locked these two opposing foundings in place—forever in 
tension with the other—so too will justices, scholars, and practitioners invoke 
these divergent frameworks for understanding the Constitution.  This 
explains why the Constitution means such contradictory things.  At the very 
start of the United States, the first and second founders placed their 
imprimatur on the Constitution.  The legacy of those dueling visions lives on 
in the way we interpret the document. 
This, in turn, suggests a reversal of the attitudinal model.  That model 
posits that politics comes first and then the law.  The two-foundings thesis 
suggests that the law—that is, the Constitution with its two faces—comes 
first, and then politics.  Rather than viewing the debates between originalists 
and moral readers as nothing other than debates between modern-day 
Republicans and Democrats, we should view the debates between these 
political parties as leitmotifs of the ancient quarrel between the first and 
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second founders.  This reveals that our political debates are ultimately about 
the two forms of government that are memorialized in the Constitution, 
based on two types of societies the founders envisioned.  After all, although 
modern-day Republicans typically are the ones to invoke the first founding, 
in our current political climate, modern-day liberals are appealing to the first 
founding and the emphasis on states’ rights to contest the national 
government.100  Heather Gerken calls this “progressive federalism,” one that 
individuals in Democratic-controlled states are using to resist President 
Trump.101   
And so, we will continue to debate vociferously about powers, rights, 
nominations to the Court, and the right interpretive methodologies justices 
should use.  Because the Constitution embodies two distinct and 
contradictory foundings—one looking forward (moral reading and a 
nationalistic view) and the other looking backwards (originalism and a state-
centered view)—there will always be two ways of understanding it.  This is the 
essence of our Constitution and the engine of our politics.  
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